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Abstract 
Corporate governance principles are trying to ensure reliable and 
well-functioning firms and sound financial systems, thus well-governed 
firms are expected to be performing better than their counterparts. The 
aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance 
applications on operating performance and share performance of 
companies that are traded in Borsa Istanbul for the period 2007-2014. In 
order to understand the impact of corporate governance traits on share 
performance, we assume that we buy and hold the stock for 1 year and 
sell it at the end of the accounting period to match it with the accounting 
data and panel regressions are run to analyze the factors that have 
significant explanatory power over operating and share performance. 
According to the results, the corporate governance traits do not affect 
stock returns, but have a significant explanatory power over operating 
performance, measured by ROA and ROE. This divergence shows that 
good governance results with superior operating performance; however 
governance benefits are not priced by the investors. The paper has 
significant implications since it analyses one of the most attractive 
emerging equity markets, namely Borsa Istanbul which has 
approximately sixty percent share of foreign investors.  The results are 
important for both policy makers and for the broad range of investors 
that are players in the market. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance emerged as a tool for protecting 
shareholders’ rights and minority shareholders. Following the corporate 
scandals all around the world, there has been a need to set rules to 
govern companies in a transparent and accountable manner. Corporate 
governance practices are seen as a means to stabilize corporations, 
financial markets and economy as a whole.  
In order to assure trust to the financial system, Cadbury Report 
(1992) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(hereafter OECD) Corporate Governance Principles (1999) were 
initiated and further revised (2004). Those principles are laid on four 
pillars; namely, transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility. 
The principles were aimed to provide insurance that all stakeholders 
attain sufficient, reliable and timely information.  
Several theories explain the corporate governance concept: most 
significant ones are the stewardship theory, the agency theory and the 
market theory. The stewardship theory states that, the people are 
assumed to act in the public good in general and the managers will act in 
the profit of their companies’ shareholders in particular (Donaldson and 
Davis 1991). It is expected that the companies should establish 
administrative and authority framework which will provide integrated 
command mechanism, smooth the way for autarchic decision making 
and allow the company to take action quickly and resolutely to market 
opportunities. This perspective results in unifying the roles of chairman 
and CEO and for audit committees to be either tenuous or incompetent. 
According to the agency theory, agents will seek to act for their own 
interest and will incline to maximize their wealth, position in company 
and other fringe benefits. Agents should be monitored and controlled to 
guarantee that the managers’ undivided attention and performance is 
served (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Nowadays, corporate governance 
activities are mostly relied on this theory. The market theory of 
corporate governance states that there is no difference whether managers 
of a company see themselves agents or stewards, because the investors 
(shareholders) will unambiguously sell the shares of such company in 
the market whose directors are not put out the sufficient effort for their 
investment (see Calder 2008). This theory is not actually very correct, 
because in most of the corporate scandals it was seen that the investors 
are not capable of realizing the bad governance of the companies and 
they ended up with shares with obsolete values.  When we evaluate these 
three theories the agency theory is found to be the one that best explains 
the structures of today, so our paper is grounded on this theory.  
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Corporate governance traits are considered as structures of 
monitoring devices that coordinate and control the interests of principles 
and agents (Farinha 2003). From this point of view, many studies relate 
those traits with some characteristics of firm like performance, 
efficiency, productivity, firm value etc. Despite the vast amount of 
studies on performance and firm value, papers focusing on the relation 
between share performance and the corporate governance characteristics 
is relatively few (Gompers et al. 2003; Core et al. 2004; Johnson et al. 
2009). The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by analyzing the effect of 
corporate governance traits on share performance and operating 
performance on the non-financial companies that are traded in Borsa 
Istanbul of Turkey for the period between 2007 and 2014.  
Turkey stands as one of the most attractive emerging markets and 
in the recent history there are many severe crises and corporate scandals. 
The transformation of the governance systems and the recovery of the 
economy make the Turkish case interesting and a good case for those 
countries which are on the edge of initiating application of corporate 
governance principles. The shares of foreign investors in Borsa Istanbul 
are greater than 60 percent and have dominance on the market. The 
results are also important to point to the tendency of foreign investors to 
markets with more compliance to corporate governance codes. The rest 
of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 will provide brief 
information about the corporate governance practices in Turkey, Section 
2 will give an overview of the literature, Section 3 will explain the 
methodology, Section 4 will present the data and the empirical results, 
finally last section will conclude.  
2. Corporate Governance Practices in Turkey 
Borsa Istanbul, which was established at the end of 1985, stands as 
the unique stock market in Turkey. Turkish economy experienced severe 
crisis in 1994, 2000 and 2001. During the crisis periods, some corporate 
scandals have also emerged and with the IMF restructuring process, new 
economic road maps were planned. Moreover, the reform program 
proposed elements to ensure sound and stable financial system. 
Recently, Borsa Istanbul has been standing as one of the most attractive 
emerging stock markets.  
Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB hereafter) published 
Turkish Corporate Governance Codes in 2003. These codes, which were 
later revised in 2005 and 2011, are based on OECD principles of 
corporate governance and while regulating those codes particular 
conditions of the country were taken into account.  
The corporate governance principles of CMB predominantly 
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attend to publicly traded joint stock companies and organizations that are 
actively doing business in public or public sector, may also put into 
practice these principles. Implementing these principles is optional for 
companies. Nevertheless, the clarification regarding the implementation 
level of the principles is not properly done, due to insufficient 
implementation of these principles, conflicts arisen and explanation 
became essential about the projected plan for the adaptation of 
company’s corporate governance practices in the annual report and 
disclose to the public. Based on the obligatory regulations by CMB, the 
rating of corporate governance is evaluated by rating organizations to 
appraise the implementation status of the principles.  
The first section of CMB Codes of Corporate Governance 
mentions the equal behavior towards shareholders and principles of their 
rights. Topics such as shareholders' right to acquire and assess data, 
entitlement to vote in the general shareholders’ meeting, the rights of 
minority shareholders and right to obtain dividend are discussed 
exhaustively in this section. Subjects such as archiving journals of 
shareholders, sales of shares and the free transferability of shares are 
also referred under the very first section.  
The second section examines the principles associated with 
transparency of information and disclosure. Within this context, 
fundamentals for setting up articulated information policies concerning 
shareholders and the obedience of companies to these policies are 
mentioned. The atmosphere of globally integrated financial systems and 
set of conditions challenged in Turkey should have been taken into 
account while implementing single standards and procedures for smooth 
information flow via annual financial reports and income statements and 
specifying aforementioned standards through deliberation of 
performance.  
The third section is primarily focused on stakeholders. In that 
section, stakeholder defined as a person, organization or a group, which 
is connected with the business related activities of a company in some 
way or another. The company’s shareholders, its employees, banks 
which lends the company, suppliers, customers, trade unions, numerous 
non-governmental organizations, the government of a country, and 
prospective investors which may examine to invest in the company in 
future are called as stakeholders. This section covers the tenets of the 
relationship between the company and its stakeholders.  
The fourth section comprises principles regarding function, 
responsibilities, assignments, operations and constitution of the board of 
directors, the committees that will be initiated in future to support the 
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board functions, executives and remuneration of them and the board of 
directors.  
Borsa Istanbul provides a means to measure the compliance of the 
companies to corporate governance codes and provide a corporate 
governance index measure. Being listed under corporate governance 
index is not obligatory, but still the exchange offers huge discounts on 
the shelf registration and registration fees if the company is listed in the 
aforementioned index.   
Two independent rating agencies monitor the compliance of the 
companies with the corporate governance practices. First, the rating 
agency analyzes the current and past shareholder structure. Existence of 
block shareholders is determined and the existence of a business interest 
with the block shareholders is investigated. The equal and timely 
dissemination of information to all shareholders is another factor to 
increase the governance rating of the company. Further, protection of the 
minority shareholders is examined. Companies with cumulative voting 
systems and where the minority interests are considered get higher 
ratings. Companies that announce the general meeting to their 
shareholders at least one month before the meeting starts in web sites as 
well as national magazines and those who organize the event at city 
centers where it is accessible by the majority of the shareholders will get 
better credits. Having a consistent dividend policy and distributing fair 
amount of dividends is another evaluated criterion. The meeting 
frequency and the attendance of the board members to the meeting of 
board of directors is another rating factor. The selection of independent 
members in the board, their background and qualifications and their 
relationship with other corporations is and the number of members in the 
board is of crucial importance. The entire criteria are also evaluated 
regularly after being included in the corporate governance index.    
Based on the above mentioned criterion the companies are rated 
over a 0-10 scale, and companies who have the total compliance with the 
governance codes are rated 10. Companies should at least have an 
overall rating scale of 7 to be included in the corporate governance index 
of Borsa Istanbul. As of June 2014 48 companies are evaluated under 
corporate governance index.  
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The literature mostly considers corporate governance concept from 
the viewpoint of agency theory and describe corporate governance as a 
tool for controlling managers to act in their own interest and protecting 
shareholders’ rights (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Dennis and McConneli 
2003; Nanka-Bruce 2011). Considering the theory, the literature lists 
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different aspects as corporate governance traits, namely, ownership 
structure, board structure and board independence and also firm specific 
factors like firm size and age stands as important characteristics 
affecting the performance and good governance of firms.  
The established laws and regulations in the system are other 
elements to protect the rights of minority shareholders. It is expected that 
investors feeling safer about their rights, tend to invest in such markets. 
Renders, Gaeremynck and Sercu (2010) studied this relationship and 
concluded that in countries with laws and regulations backing 
shareholder rights, firms have higher governance ratings which are not 
reflected in superior firm performance. On the other hand, in countries 
with weak shareholder protections, companies with good governance 
traits tend to be performing better than the firms lacking those traits.  
 
3.1. Board Structure and Independence 
Boards stand as a key in the development of a firm with their roles 
of delegating and monitoring firm’s activities. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
explain that the operations of a company are complicated and thus when 
the operations of the company are expanded, more members are needed 
in the board to monitor them. Boone et al. (2007) reach to similar 
conclusions and concluded that when the company is opened to other 
geographical regions or production lines are enlarged, new members will 
be needed to control those operations. Accordingly, some papers favor 
the increase in the number of board members (Dalton et al. 1999; Abidin 
et al. 2009; Isshaq 2009) some others reject and disclose that firm 
performance declines as the number of board members increases 
(Yermack 1996; Bhagat and Black 2002; Huang et al. 2011; Nanka-
Bruce 2011). 
Isshaq (2009) indicate a positive relationship between the size of 
the board and share performance. Dalton, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999) 
explain this positive relation with resource dependence theory. 
According to this theory, bigger boards have larger networks and thus 
lead the firm to more resources. Moreover, these boards’ effectiveness 
will increase with an authoritarian CEO.  Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and 
Johnson (1998) point that bigger boards are the only way to monitor 
managers when the ownership is dispersed among many small 
shareholders or when the biggest shareholder ignores the minority 
shareholders.  
Conversely, Yermack (1996) conclude that larger boards are more 
difficult to coordinate and members will communicate less and will have 
less power over CEO, thus smaller boards are more effective and result 
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in greater performance. Similarly, Jensen (1993), Eisenberg, Sundgren, 
Wells (1998) and Mak and Yuanto (2002) express that smaller boards 
with less monitoring activities will end up with higher firm performance 
and exclaim that the members in bigger boards will have more conflict 
of interest and decision making will be slower in those boards. 
Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) note that the monitoring 
performance of independent directors will be diminished when they 
become less dependent to the CEO. Hence, a company board dominated 
by independent directors will work less effective than the contrary case.    
In this paper the relevance of resource dependence theory in 
Turkish stock market will be analyzed. Thus, the first hypothesis posits 
that the board size increase the operating performance of the company, 
by linking it to greater and better sources. The share prices of companies 
with better operating performance are more likely to increase, resulting 
in a superior share performance. Thus we hypothesize that larger boards 
have a positive effect on the share performance and operating 
performance of firms. 
 
Hypothesis 1. 
H1a0: Board size has a positive effect on operating performance of 
firms. 
H1b0: Board size has a positive effect on share performance of 
firms. 
 
In addition to board size, board independence stands as an 
indispensable trait that a firm has to possess to maintain an efficient 
corporate governance mechanism. The existence of independent board 
members and an independent audit committee and separation of the role 
of the CEO as the chairman of the board will affect the independence of 
the board (Ryan and Wiggins 2004). Even the Cadbury Report 
recommended for the boards to carry at least 3 independent board 
members. The share of the members with no relation with management 
and with no ownership in the firms’ will increase the productivity 
(Chakroun 2013). Besides that, constituting a structure of external 
directors or establishing an audit committee for intra firm activities is a 
path through decentralized board and verifies that the board operates its 
liabilities fluently (Kang and Kim 2012). A board with independent 
members will result with a more effective monitoring of the CEO (Laux 
2008).  Moreover, remuneration and incentives of independent directors 
should be cautiously identified. However, there is no consensus 
regarding the remuneration of independent directors and it is difficult to 
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mention of an established regulation in detail among different countries 
(Zattoni and Cuomo 2010).  
The Turkish laws necessitate the existence of independent board 
members in the board since 2012. According to the Capital Markets Law 
of Turkey, the number of independent members within the board should 
be no lower than the one third of the total members and independent of 
the board size, each board should carry at least 2 independent members. 
Since it is not obligatory to have independent members before 2012, 
companies do not report this information. It is seen that the members 
that are reported as independent after 2012 were considered as regular 
members of the board before 2012. This raises suspicions about the real 
independence of these members and the lack of data creates a difficulty 
in analyzing and interpreting this criterion so evaluation of the 
independent members had to be dismissed.  
Another criterion that determines the independence of the board is 
CEO-duality. CEO-duality refers to the set of circumstances when the 
CEO also performs duties as the chairman of the board (Rechner and 
Dalton 1991). According to the agency theory CEO-duality embraces the 
CEO with super powers, thus will end up with the inability of the board 
to monitor the CEO (Finkelstein and D'aveni 1994; Gul and Leung 
2004).  On the other hand, some papers also note that centralization of 
authority increase the efficiency and result in superior performance 
(Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Elyased 2007; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn 
2010). 
 
Hypothesis 2.  
H2a0: The existence of CEO-duality has a positive significant effect 
on the operating performance. 
H2b0: The existence of CEO-duality has a positive significant effect 
on the share performance. 
 
3.2. Ownership Structure 
The owners of a corporation, the biggest shareholder, dispersed 
shareholders or institutional investors will affect the monitoring of the 
managers and will influence the operations of the managers. Thus, the 
owners with better monitoring activities will have an increasing effect on 
the efficiency of the management.  
The monitoring activities of the largest shareholder may not be 
proper all the time; those owners may violate the rights of minority 
shareholders for their own interest (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). On the 
other hand, if the largest shareholders have managerial skills, they may 
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be keen on transferring their skills and information that will further 
improve the firm performance. Moreover, the largest shareholder will 
have the power to monitor the activities of the managers and thus agency 
costs will be minimized (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). When the shares are 
dispersed, it is observed that managers do not act in accordance with the 
shareholders’ interest and they may not perform their duties properly 
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985). Ullah (2017) investigates 1362 firms that are 
listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange.  He claimed that ownership structure 
has strong effects on corporate performance. When managers do not 
manage the firm well this will decrease the performance of the company 
which will lead to unfavorable financial results. Gonenc and Aybar 
(2006) also confirmed that in Turkey especially in the financial crisis 
period, firms with concentrated ownership showed substantially lower 
return performance.  
The share of the second largest shareholders is also of significance, 
since they also monitor the largest shareholder’s activities. As Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2003) notes the presence of a second large owner 
probably assure inspect on the largest shareholder lowering the risk of 
take over. We build the third hypothesis that the second largest 
shareholder has an impact on corporate performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3.  
H3a0: The share of largest shareholder has a positive significant 
effect on share performance. 
H3b0: The share of largest shareholder has a positive significant 
effect on operating performance. 
H3c0: The share of second largest shareholder has a positive 
significant effect on share performance. 
H3d0: The share of second largest shareholder has a positive 
significant effect on operating performance. 
 
The ownership status of the firm also has an effect on the 
performance of the company. If the firm is a public corporation, political 
interests will be considered instead of the performance of the firm. In 
addition, social policies will be counted more instead of profitability of 
the firm (Boubakri et al. 2005). Besides, some researchers found that 
free float rate of a firm has statistically significant effect on firm’s 
financial performance and profitability (Karaca and Eksi 2012;  Dogan 
and Yildiz 2013).  Additionally, the bigger cost accounts and inefficient 
allocation of the resources in public companies will end up with 
unprofitable results (Sun et al. 2002). Correspondingly, the effect of 
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foreign owners on the firm performance is considered to positive most of 
the time (Douma et al. 2006). Javorcik (2004) also confirmed that 
foreign owners increase the performance and efficiency through the 
increased access to resources. Foreign shareholders also may bring in 
new technology and know-how, which will differentiate the firm’s 
products/services and further will increase the profitability of the firm.  
 
Hypothesis 4.  
H4a0: The public ownership of the company has a negative 
significant effect on share performance. 
H4b0: The public ownership of the company has a negative 
significant effect on operating performance. 
H4c0: The foreign ownership of the company has a positive 
significant effect on share performance. 
H4d0: The foreign ownership of the company has a positive 
significant effect on operating performance. 
H4e0: The share of the company open to public has a positive 
significant effect on share performance. 
H4f0: The share of the company open to public has a positive 
significant effect on operating performance. 
 
3.3. Experience and Size of the Firm 
Experience of the firm is assumed to be dependent on the firm age 
or the amount of time the firm’s shares are traded in the stock market. 
Firm age is defined as the amount of time that passed from the first 
establishment of the company. Loderer and Waelchli (2011) conclude 
that older firms find it more difficult to access to critical resources and 
hence will be beaten by its competitors. They also proved that there is a 
non-linear and inverse relationship between age and profitability of the 
firm. There is still an inverse relationship when they repeated their study 
by defining the age of the firm from the moment after it was quoted to 
the stock exchange as Shumway (2001) described it.  Nevertheless, 
decreasing of the profitability of the firms when they get old does not 
mean that there is more possibility in terms of making losses for the 
firms. It is observed that probability of making losses of the firms’ 
decreases in an inversely correlated fashion when experience, network 
and easy nature of accessing the resource are considered.  (Loderer and 
Waelchli 2010). 
Firm size is generally considered as the sales revenues and total 
number of employees (Westhead 1995). European Commission (2005) 
defines the firm size as the number of employees, volume of business or 
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total assets of the company. Kitov (2009) describe the firm size as the 
number of employees and financial returns in a financial period.  
Some papers in the literature define size of the firm by the amount 
of total assets (or fixed assets) a firm owns.  It has been considered that 
effective management of assets and profitability over thus assets or in 
other words, performance defined by the active profitability would 
increase as well. Studies showed that firms reach to economies of scale 
with the growth therefore; they cut out their expenditure and increase 
their profit margins.  In the light of these findings it is been suggested 
that relationship between the size of the firm and performance has the 
same direction (Zeleynuk and Zheka 2006; Lin et al. 2009). 
 
Hypothesis 5.  
H5a0: The age of the company has a positive significant effect on 
share performance. 
H5b0: The age of the company has a positive significant effect on 
operating performance. 
H5c0: The size of the company has a positive significant effect on 
share performance. 
H5d0: The size of the company has a positive significant effect on 
operating performance.  
 
4. Methodology 
To understand the impact of corporate governance traits on share 
performance, we assume that we buy and hold the stock for 1 year and 
sell it at the end of the accounting period to match it with the accounting 
data. So for each share yearly holding period returns are calculated with 
the following formula: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
 
 
The abnormal returns are also calculated with the intention to 
observe the returns over the market. Borsa Istanbul 100 index is the most 
common market indicator in Turkey so the yearly BIST-100 Index buy 
and hold return is deducted from the stock returns as follows: 
 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐵𝐼𝑆𝑇−100,𝑡 
 
Panel regressions are run to analyze the factors that have 
significant explanatory power over share performance: 
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𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1∑𝐶𝐺𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2∑𝐹𝑆𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      Model 1 
 
Where return represents the stock return and excess return, CGT 
represents the corporate governance traits of companies which include 
the largest share, second largest share, CEO-duality, board size, firm 
age, number of years in stock market, public ownership dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the company is a publicly owned company, free 
float rate and share of foreigners, FSF represents size and liquidity ratios 
of the companies and OP symbolize the operating performance which is 
represented by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE).   
Further regressions are performed to address the impact of 
corporate governance practices on operating performance.  
 
𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1∑𝐶𝐺𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2∑𝐹𝑆𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ++𝜀𝑖,𝑡                           Model 2 
 
5. Data Analysis and Empirical Results 
The data regarding the corporate governance traits of companies 
and financial statements is collected from the website of “Public 
Disclosure Platform of Turkey”. The data related to stock prices and the 
stock market index is collected from the website of Borsa Istanbul. The 
analysis covers the period between 2007 and 2014 for the non-financial 
companies that are traded in Borsa Istanbul. Financial firms excluded 
because of the different legal regulations and complex balance sheet 
structures. The firms with missing information about corporate 
governance are removed from the analysis.  
Table 1 presents the data used in the analysis. For the first model, 
the dependent variable is the stock return, which assumes one year 
holding period and the excess return, namely the difference between the 
stock return and the market return. Since investors consider the ROA 
and ROE as a performance indicator, it is expected that these variables 
are also a determinant for Model 1. On the other hand, ROA and ROE 
are adopted as proxies of operating performance. The corporate 
governance variables used in both models are headed under board 
independence, firm experience and ownership structure.  
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Table 1: Definition of the data used in the analysis 
Performance Variables  
Return on Assets Net Income divided by Total Assets 
(used also as a determinant of stock 
return) 
Return on Equity Net Income divided by Total 
Shareholders’ Equity Assets (used also as 
a determinant of stock return) 
Return The rate of return for the stock for a 1-
year holding period 
Excess Return The return for the stock in excess of the 
market return (BIST-100 index return) 
Corporate Governance 
Characteristics 
 
Board Structure and Independence  
Largest Share The percentage share of the biggest 
shareholder 
Second Largest Share The percentage share of the second 
biggest shareholder 
CEO-duality Dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
CEO is also the chairman of the board, 0 
otherwise. 
Board Size  Total number of members in the board 
Firm Experience  
Firm age The number of years that passed from the 
first establishment of the company 
Number of years in stock market The number of years that the firms is 
traded in the Borsa Istanbul 
Ownership Structure  
D-Public Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 
company is public, 0 otherwise 
Free Float Rate The percentage of shares that are open to 
public 
Foreign Ownership The percentage of shares that are owned 
by foreigners 
Firm Specific Factors  
Firm Size Natural logarithm of the firms’ total 
assets 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables for the Period 2007-2014 
   Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
Largest Share 0.516 0.994 0.015 0.225 989 
Second Largest Share 0,110 0,490 0,000 0,131 989 
Firm Age 39,455 71.000 9.000 12.354 989 
CEO-Duality 0.431 1.000 0.000 0.495 989 
Free Float Rate 0.326 1,000 0.003 0.192 989 
Number of years in stock market 18,41 29.000 1.000 6,068 989 
Stock Return 0.292 7.833 -0.840 0.768 989 
Excess Return 0,100 6,867 -1,366 0,619 989 
Dummy Public 0.065 1.000 0.000 0.246 989 
Return on Assets 0.039 1,056 -1.295 0.124 989 
Return on Equity 0.034 2.051 -4.775 0.431 989 
Firm Size 19.474 23.830 15.058 1.525 989 
Board Size 6.949 15.000 3.000 2.115 989 
Foreign Ownership 14,955 99.460 0.000 28,469 989 
 
The panel regression results for Model 1 are reported in Table 3. 
The regression results show that none of the corporate governance traits 
has a statistically significant effect on the stock returns of the companies. 
In all of the regression where return is the dependent variable ROA and 
ROE has been found to have a positive effect on the returns. When the 
dependent variable is the excess return it is seen that ROA has a 
statistically significant and positive effect. The analysis of the 
relationship between corporate governance and business performance is 
also researched on Romanian economy, and similarly the results suggest 
a statistically significant relationship between corporate governance and 
ROA of the company (Achim et al. 2015). Size is also a significant 
variable in all of the regressions except for one, pointing to a positive 
relation between returns and size. This is contrary to most findings noted 
as size effect in the literature (Banz 1981; Reinganum 1981; Brown et al. 
1983; Fama and French 1992). However, the literature further points to 
the disappearance of size effect; see for example Dichev (1998), Chan et 
al. (2000), Horowitz et al. (2000) and Van Dijk (2011) also explained 
that these extreme returns could be due to several biases including 
investor behavior. We also think that the investors have a more tendency 
to invest in bigger firms, which further causes an increased demand for 
these shares and thus higher returns. The general conclusion we can 
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draw from Model 1 is that the corporate governance traits in general fail 
to explain the movements in the stock returns. Thus, the null hypothesis 
1a, 2a, 3a, 4a and 5a is rejected.  
Table 3: Stock Performance Regression Results 
Dependent 
Variable 
Return Return Return Return Excess Excess Excess Excess 
Explanatory 
Variables 
        
Largest Share 
0.0006 
(0.5918) 
0.0005 
(0.5090) 
0.0005 
(0.4376) 
0.0004 
(0.3444) 
-0,0000 
(-0.0014) 
-0.0001 
(-0.1088) 
-0.0001 
(-0.1093) 
-0.0002 
(-0.2228) 
Second Largest 
0,00009 
(0.0682) 
0.0002 
(0.1315) 
-0.0002 
(-0.1468) 
-0,0001 
(-0.0798) 
-0.0004 
(-0.3425) 
-0.0003 
(-0.2753) 
-0.0006 
(-0.4782) 
-0.0005 
(-0.4091) 
Age 
-0.0001 
(-0.0857) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.0633 
 -0.0003 
(-0.1919) 
 -0.0003 
(-0.1823) 
 
Age_Stockm 
 0.0027 
(0.7410) 
 0.0028 
(0.8218) 
 0.0027 
(0.7663) 
 0.0028 
(0.8063) 
Board Size 
0.0035 
(0.3929) 
0.0034 
(0.3853) 
0.0019 
(0.2151) 
0.0018 
(0.2115) 
-0.0005 
(-0.0558) 
-0.0007 
(-0.0763) 
-0.0013 
(-0.1535) 
-0.0014 
(-0.1689) 
Duality 
-0.0130 
(-0.3765) 
-0.0145 
(-0.4331) 
-0.0159 
(-0.4697) 
-0.0175 
(-0.5323) 
-0.0089 
(-0.2608) 
-0.0109 
(-0.3279) 
-0.0107 
(-0.3164) 
-0.0127 
(-0.3884) 
Foreign  Share 
-0.0003 
(-0.5553) 
-0.0004 
(-0.6958) 
-0.0002 
(-0.4226) 
-0.0003 
(-0.5858) 
-0.0002 
(-0.3403) 
-0.0003 
(-0.4944) 
-0.0001 
(-0.2636) 
-0.0002 
(-0.4293) 
Free Float 
-0.0566 
(-0.4952) 
-0.0574 
(-0.5279) 
-0.0540 
(-0.4858) 
-0.0556 
(-0.5234) 
-0.1369 
(-1.4069) 
-0.1360 
(-1.4599) 
-0.1356 
(-1.4124) 
-0.1351 
(-1.4680) 
D-Public 
-0.0128 
(-0.2390) 
-0.0255 
(-0.4475) 
-0.0260 
(-0.4731) 
-0.0396 
(-0.6756) 
-0.0092 
(-0.1745) 
-0.0228 
(-0.4065) 
-0.0168 
(-0.3147) 
-0.0309 
(-0.5419) 
ROA 
0.0029** 
(2.1717) 
0.0032** 
(2.3274) 
  0.0021* 
(1.7607) 
0.0025* 
(1.9487) 
  
ROE 
  0.1124* 
(1.7513) 
0.1136* 
(1.7798) 
  0.0654 
(1.2681) 
0.0666 
(1.3036) 
Size 
0.0212** 
(1.9215) 
0.0200* 
(1.8375) 
0.0185* 
(1.7306) 
0.0172 
(1.6222) 
0.0247** 
(2.2276) 
0.0232** 
(2.1236) 
0.0230** 
(2.1346) 
0.0213** 
(2.0091) 
C 
-0.1447 
(-0.7260) 
-0.1670 
(-0.8472) 
-0.0734 
(-0.3836) 
-0.0946 
(-0.5019) 
-0.3082 
(-1.5972) 
-0.3319* 
(-1.7326) 
-0.2645 
(-1.4129) 
-0.2863 
(-1.5476) 
R-squared 0.3045 0.3048 0.3081 0.3085 0.0878 0.0883 0.0897 0.0902 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2923 0.2926 0.2960 0.2964 0.0719 0.0724 0.0738 0.0743 
F-statistic 25.0065 25.0446 25.4378 25.4822 5.5005 5.5341 5.6284 5.6649 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The numbers in 
parenthesis represent the t-statistics of the coefficients.  
 
The results for the determinants of operating performance appear 
in Table 4. According to the results, the share of the largest shareholder 
has a negative effect on ROA and the share of the second largest 
shareholder has a deteriorating effect on ROE. Thus, Hypothesis 3a and 
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3c are rejected. Age of the firm and the number of years in stock market 
are found as significant determinants and it supports Hypothesis 5. Age 
and age in stock market has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on ROA at 1% significance level and at 10% significance level on ROE. 
This finding shows that as the firm gets older, its experience increase 
and result in favorable results for operating performance. This finding is 
in harmony with the traditional neoclassical view of the firm. Since older 
firms may get a better interest rate, may specialize in the division of 
labor and division of fixed costs across large number of units, their 
profitability may be higher (Pervan and Visic 2012). Free float has been 
found as a factor effecting both ROA and ROE negatively in all 
regressions. As the outstanding shares of the firm increases, the 
operating performance of the firm declines. This finding emphasizes the 
lack of shareholders’ control on the management.  
Among the corporate governance traits, CEO-duality tends to have 
a positive statistical significance in explaining ROA. This finding is in 
line with the idea that centralization of authority increases the efficiency 
(Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Elyased 2007; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn 
2010). Firms with foreign ownership generate higher returns on assets, 
which is also noted in the literature that foreign firms provide better 
access to capital and technology (Caves 1996; Perez-Gonzalez 2005). In 
line with the literature, the results suggest that foreign ownership of the 
companies increase the ROA by almost 1% at 10% significance level. 
Firm size, on the other hand, is negatively affecting ROA at 1% 
significance level.  
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Table 4: Operating Performance Regression Results 
Dependent Variable    ROA   ROA   ROE   ROE 
Largest Share 
-0.0250* 
(-1.6827) 
-0.0251* 
(-1.6821) 
 0,0000 
(0.1302) 
 0,0000 
(0.1273) 
Second Largest 
Share 
0.0076 
(0.6301) 
0.0073 
(0.5965) 
-0.0011* 
(-1.7415) 
-0.0011* 
(-1.7582) 
Age 
0.5351*** 
(2.9601)  
0.0056* 
(1.9001)  
Age_Stockm  
0.5361*** 
(2.9540)  
0.0056* 
(1.9327) 
Free Float 
-1.9705*** 
(-3.6618) 
-1.9708*** 
(-3.6721) 
-0.0383* 
(-1.7752) 
-0.0380* 
(-1.7623) 
Board Size 
0.0787 
(1.1762) 
0.0783 
(1.1765) 
0.0051 
(1.6426) 
0.0050* 
(1.6231) 
Duality 
0.1894* 
(1.9307) 
0.2012** 
(2.0352) 
-0.0076 
(-1.2962) 
-0.0077 
(-1.3134) 
D-Public 
0.0708 
(0.1911) 
0.0730 
(0.1961) 
-0.0007 
(-0.0215) 
-0.0004 
(-0.0138) 
Foreign Share 
0.0092* 
(1.6482) 
0.0092* 
(1.6497) 
0.0002 
(0.2358) 
0.0002 
(0.2360) 
Size 
-6.2188*** 
(-2.7551) 
-6.2219*** 
(-2.7547) 
0.0013 
(0.2695) 
0.0013 
(0.2692) 
C 
101.15*** 
(2.7019) 
112.47*** 
(2.7265) 
-0.2269 
(-1.1816) 
-0.1099 
(-0.7764) 
R-squared 0.5666 0.5668 0.6412 0.6405 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4980 0.4983 0.5844 0.5837 
F-statistic 8.2627 8.2700 11.292 11.262 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. The numbers in parenthesis represent the t-statistics of the 
coefficients. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Following the corporate scandals, there has been a need to reassure 
trust to the financial system. Thus, new regulations and new standards to 
the corporations have become obligatory in many countries, to ensure 
that all the investors and stakeholders receive timely and reliable 
information about the firm’s financial position. These standards also 
include aspects to protect all the shareholder’s rights that may be 
violated due to agency problems and furthermore they ensure that big 
shareholders abuse their power and do not act for their own interest.  
The literature notes several traits to measure the degree of good 
governance. These traits can be summed under board independence, firm 
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size and age and owner structure. Firms that possess these traits will 
prevent managers and bigger shareholders to take advantage of their 
power.  
The motivation of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate 
governance traits on both the operating performance and share 
performance of the 129 non-financial firms in Borsa Istanbul for the 
2007 and 2014 period. To consider the share performance, we assume 
that we have a one year holding period, so yearly returns and excess 
returns from Borsa Istanbul 100 index are calculated for each stock. We 
performed panel regressions and run CEO-duality, board size, largest 
share, second largest share, firm age, public company dummy, foreign 
owners’ share, free float rate and firm size as independent variables. The 
results convey that none of the corporate governance traits has a 
significant effect on the stock returns of the companies.  
The second part of the paper focuses on the effects of corporate 
governance on operating performance. As a representation for operating 
performance return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) is 
adopted. The results of the regression show that both performance 
measures are affected from some of the corporate governance traits. 
Firm age and number of years in stock market affect both ROA and 
ROE positively and significantly. The experience of the firm has a 
positive influence on the performance, since firms with more 
information about the processes, also may have brand loyalty than the 
new ones and end up with higher returns. Board size is also found as 
increasing the ROA of firms, which is in line with the resource 
dependence theory. When the number of the members in the board 
increase, the ability of the firm to reach to resources and information 
increases. Contrary to the agency theory, CEO-duality improves the 
ROA of firms. When CEO is also the board chair, centralization of the 
authority improves the performance of the firms. It is thought that 
manager being also the chairman of the board and thus takes more 
responsibility in managing the firm and endeavor more. Among the 
owner structure foreign ownership is found to have a positive impact on 
ROA. The impact of foreign ownership is sizably noted in the literature 
that foreign partners increase the firms’ ability to access capital and 
technology, thus result in superior performance. Size has also 
explanatory power over ROA. Firms with higher equity tend to be more 
profitable and bigger firms also are more likely to be profitable. 
Overall results infer that corporate governance characteristics do 
not have a direct effect on stock returns but rather on operating returns. 
Governance traits to ensure board independence and managerial 
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effectiveness prove fruitful, with statistical significance on the 
performance of companies. On the other hand, it is seen that none of 
these traits have power over stock returns. This divergence of the effect 
of corporate governance traits on operating and share performance can 
be explained with the investors’ prospects. Since stock returns are 
basically based on investor expectations, we can conclude that these 
traits are not priced by the investors in Borsa Istanbul. The traders in the 
stock market do not consider too much about the board characteristics or 
ownership structure of the companies. Given that the corporate 
governance principles’ main aim is to protect the minority shareholders, 
it is possible to conclude that the investors do not regard these yet. 
Hence, the motivation of the investors in the stock market should be 
analyzed in depth. It is assumed that the financial literacy of the 
investors is limited. The legal authorities should ensure that the investors 
are aware of their voting rights and rights that are tried to be supported 
with the corporate governance principles. In addition, the investors 
should realize that they are not only investors trying to realize a capital 
gain, but instead they are owners of the firms with their shares and they 
have power over the firms’ managers to act in their own interest, by 
increasing their returns. The managers should also realize that these 
principles do not only favor the investors, but the application of these 
principles end up with superior performance results.  
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